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ABSTRACT
Satellite communications networks have 
supplanted other over-the-horizon 
communications systems because of their high 
capacity and high reliability. A key 
characteristic of satellite communications 
systems is that all communication links within a 
network share a common transponder and thus have 
the potential for deleterious interactions. 
This in turn gives rise to the need for a 
network control function that can establish and 
ensure appropriate transmission characteristics 
for each terminal with the goal of maximizing 
the communications capacity available to all 
network members.
Because of the potential for electronic 
countermeasures in military satellite 
communications systems, an antijam mode of 
operations, which by its very nature is a 
reduced capacity mode, is often included in the 
network architecture. This in turn puts added 
burdens on the control function for the network. 
Both a clear mode of operation and an antijam 
mode of operation (often with different 
properties and characteristics) must be 
controlled and, furthermore, a timely mechanism 
for transitioning between the two modes must be 
provided.
In this paper the generic top level requirements 
are defined for a military satellite 
communications control system. The control 
system function is then divided into its key 
components and generic requirements are provided 
for each component. Alternative strategies for 
both communicator and jammer are discussed 
leading to the flow of events that would result 
in the transitioning of the SATCOM network in 
response to a changing ECM environment.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper the satellite network control 
system is examined first. For both a
nonmilitary and military satellite 
communications network the control system 
rationale and requirements are presented. The 
control system is then subdivided into its 
component subsystems and qualitative 
requirements are provided for the subsystems.
Following this the strategies that are 
available to both the jammer and the 
communicator are discussed with respect to the 
operation and design of the control system.
To put all this in perspective the paper 
concludes with a typical flow of events that 
could successfully transition the network in 
response to a changing ECM environment.
Control System Rationale and Requirements
Briefly stated, the fundamental purpose for a 
satellite network control system is to allocate 
satellite resources in some optimum manner. 
The satellite resources to be allocated are the 
downlink EIRP and bandwidth and the allocations 
must be made to each SATCOM terminal 
participating in the network. The allocations 
take the form of designations on the uplink 
signal parameters for each SATCOM terminal.
From the network control point of view an 
optimum allocation is one where the capacity 
available for reliable information transfer 
through the satellite is maximized for each 
user. Given that there is an upper system 
capacity based on the satellite transponder and 
earth terminal designs, it is the function of 
the network control system to determine 
allocations that result in a total operating 
capacity that approaches the maximum system 
capacity available from the equipment while 
maintaining an acceptable level of link 
availability. To do this it must minimize 
wasted capacity and it must assure that the 
transmissions from network participants do not 
interfere and thus reduce system capacity.
How the control system both reduces wasted 
capacity and assures that network participants
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do not interfere with each other depends on the 
method by which the satellite resources are 
shared between the user SATCOM terminals. The 
method of sharing which is generally called the 
multiple access technique determines what 
parameters of the uplink transmissions must be 
controlled and based on the particulars of the 
specific network, how accurately they must be 
controlled.
There are three principal multiple access 
techniques; frequency division multiple access 
(FDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA) 
and code division multiple access (COMA). 
There is no intent in this paper to compare the 
virtues or shortcomings of each but since the 
control system requirements are related to the 
multiple access technique, a brief 
consideration of the three approaches is 
warranted.
U3 
U2 
U1
FDMA ALL USERS ARE ON ALL THE TIME 
BUT ARE SEPARATED IN FREQUENCY
U3 
U2 
U1
TDMA ALL USERS ARE ON AT DIFFERENT TIMES
BUT WHEN ON UTILIZE THE ENTIRE
AVAILABLE BANDWIDTH
U3
- U2
U1
U3 
U2
COMA ALL USERS ON ALL THE TIME AND EACH
USES THE ENTIRE BANDWIDTH 13169-2
Figure "I. Multiple Access Techniques
Frequency division multiple access assigns a 
portion of the transponder bandwidth to each 
network participant. The channel spacings on 
the uplinks are determined by the instantaneous 
bandwidth of the uplink transmissions and the 
required frequency guard bands as determined by 
the filtering characteristics in the earth 
terminals. From a control point of view it is 
obvious that uplink frequency assignments must 
be adhered to in order to avoid interference 
between users. In addition, since in an FDMA 
system all users are simultaneously present in 
the transponder, the uplink power for each user 
must be carefully controlled. This is 
necessary so that both potential 
intermodulation interference and power lost to 
intermods (due to nonlinearities in the 
satellite transponder) are avoided, and that 
potential user capacity is not lost to 
excessive link margins.
Time division multiple access systems assign a 
time slot in a master time frame to each earth 
terminal participating in the network. In the 
assigned time slot the earth terminal has 
exclusive use of the entire transponder 
bandwidth and power. The earth terminal 
operates in a burst mode with a symbol rate 
consistent with the transponder bandwidth. 
With respect to the control requirements, the 
time of transmission for each earth station 
must be carefully controlled since transmissions 
overlapping in time will obliterate each other 
and transmissions not fully occupying an 
assigned time slot mean wasted capacity. 
However, the power control problem of FDMA no 
longer exists since only one user is present in 
the transponder at any instant of time. The 
power control requirement is reduced to ensuring 
that a constant minimum EIRP, enough to 
saturate the transponder, is always exceeded. 
The value is independent of the transmitting 
terminal characteristics, the information rate 
being transmitted from the terminal and the 
number of terminals in the network.
Code division multiple access systems separate 
user signals not in time or frequency but with 
an additional signal modulation. An orthogonal 
PN code is phase or frequency modulated on each 
of the user uplinks, allowing a receiver with a 
matched replica code to receive the desired 
signal without interference from the other 
transmissions in the network. COMA has the 
characteristic of multiple simultaneous users 
in the transponder as does FDMA, so excess 
margin on any link equates to reduced capacity 
for other users. The power control problem 
with respect to intermodulation interference, 
however, is not as severe because of the 
interference reduction properties of the signal 
structure. Like TDMA, there is a timing 
accuracy requirement; however, in CDMA it is on 
a link-by-link basis (receiver and transmitter 
for each link) rather than on a network-wide 
basis .
Of the signal parameters mentioned above, the 
control of frequency and time are rather 
mundane. That is not to say either is an easy 
engineering problem, but it is the control and 
selection of earth terminal EIRP and bandwidth 
that is really at the heart of the network 
control function. These earth terminal 
parameters specifically determine the satellite 
allocations.
Based on the above, one can formulate two key 
types of quantitative requirements that can be 
placed on a satellite network control system. 
The first is to maintain no greater than some 
stated link margin on every link in the 
network. This is a legitimate requirement 
since, while link margin is fine for the 
particular link (because it assures a greater 
availability of the link), it isn't fine for 
other network members or potential members. 
Excessive link margin reduces the capacity
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available to all other users and potential 
users. The second requirement is a maximum 
acceptable response time in which the control 
system must correct a deviation from the 
designated link margin on any link in the 
network. This requirement would seem naturally 
to be a function of both the polarity and 
magnitude of the deviation as well as on the 
particular link experiencing the deviation. 
For example, a negative deviation from a 
prescribed link margin means a statistically 
less available link and therefore a short 
response time would appear appropriate. On the 
other hand a positive deviation from link 
. margin which means a loss of potential network 
capacity might require a response time 
inversely related to the amount of lost 
capacity. Thus, for a given deviation (in 
dB's) longer response times might be acceptable 
for lower capacity links than for higher 
capacity links. Similarly, for a link of given 
capacity the greater the deviation the shorter 
the required response time.
"Control system requirements center about 
maintaining no greater than some stated link 
margin on every li/fk in the network."
This fundamental issue of link availability 
versus network capacity takes on an entirely 
new dimension in a military satellite 
communications network. In this paper a 
military satellite communications network will 
be/distinguished from a nonmilitary network 
srolely by its potential to be a target for 
electronic countermeasures. As a target for 
ECM the well designed military communications 
system must include for each of its links an 
antijam or ECCM mode of operation. But such a 
mode by its very nature is a reduced capacity 
mode since it either uses power or bandwidth or 
both far in excess of what is necessary for 
information transfer in order to defeat the 
potential jammer. Therefore the tradeoff 
between link availability and system capacity 
is greatly magnified. If one initiates an 
antijam mode of operation too early there is a 
significant loss of capacity. If one initiates 
an antijam mode of operation too late there is 
no link availability. This substantiates the 
need for a timely mechanism for transitioning 
between modes. Complicating the situation 
further is the fact that with a jammer 
attacking the satellite transponder there is a 
definite question as to the capacity available 
to the network. Allocations must then be made 
in an environment far different than in the 
nonmilitary network situation which is 
characterized by a much more accurate data base.
Subsystem Definition
The control function can be divided into three 
separate subfunctions, each defining a related 
subsystem to perform an appropriate task. The 
three subfunctions are monitoring, allocation 
and communications and together they constitute
the control process. Monitoring addresses the 
analysis of the downlink from the satellite. 
It is the information gathering process on 
which to base allocation decisions regarding 
the network participants. The allocation 
subfunction determines the key uplink signal 
parameters of EIRP, bit rate and, "if 
applicable, an antijam or clear operating mode 
for each of the SATCOM terminals in the 
network. The communication subfunction has the 
responsibility of communicating the allocation 
decisions made by the control system to each of 
the SATCOM terminals. This is pictorially 
shown in Figure 2.
MONITORING
RECEIVE SATELLITE
DOWNLINK SIGNAL
PROCESSING TO DETERMINE
CHARACTERISTICS
ALLOCATION
COMPUTATIONS BASED ON
RECEIVED MONITORING
INFORMATION AND STORED
DATA BASE CONTROL TERMINAL
Figure 2. The Control Process
"The three subfunctions that comprise the 
control process are monitoring, allocation, and 
communication."
In attempting to develop some generic 
requirements for each of the three subsystems, 
the initial considerations go to apportioning 
the control system response time and maximum 
allowable link margin requirements to each' of 
the subsystems. With respect to response time, 
a portion of the total budget must be ascribed 
to each of the three subsystems. A finite time 
is necessary to process the received satellite 
downlink and determine the appropriate received 
signal characteristics. Similarly, time is 
necessary to complete the allocation process 
which is a calculation intensive task based 
upon a stored data base and the monitoring 
results. Finally, the communication 
subfunction needs a time allocation that must 
consider the limited data rate likely for 
control communications as well as the need to 
communicate possibly a different message to 
each of the earth terminals in the network.
The requirement for a maximum allowable link 
margin on each link in the network will impact 
the monitoring subsystem and the allocation 
subsystem. The monitoring subsystem is 
impacted because it has the requirement for 
gathering the data on which an estimate of 
existing link margin will be made. The 
allocation subsystem is impacted because it 
must include the calculation capability that 
makes the link margin estimate as well as 
relate the required change in earth terminal 
uplink parameters to the desired change in link 
margin.
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More can be said about the requirements for 
each of the subsystems in the cases of both a 
nonmilitary and a military satellite network 
control system. For the monitoring subsystem, 
the basic requirement is the accuracy to which 
downlink signal power can be measured. With 
respect to the measurement of downlink power, 
an output from the monitoring subsystem that 
can support a decision on whether or not the 
satellite transponder is saturated is an 
important monitoring subsystem requirement. 
When, as in the case of a military system, the 
potential for jamming is introduced, an 
immediate additional requirement should be 
placed on the monitoring subsystem and that is 
to support jammer identification and 
characterization. The first step in that 
process is to be able to distinguish the 
effects of an equipment failure from the 
effects of a jammer. Once that can be 
accomplished additional jammer characterization 
requirements, such as determining if the jammer 
is time varying or stationary in time, if the 
jammer is an uplink jammer or a downlink 
jammer, and what frequency channels the jammer 
is attacking, are all legitimate requirements.
The allocation subsystem is also significantly 
more complex for the military network than for 
the nonmilitary network. First, anytime a 
jammer is introduced the potential for a 
continually time varying network status is a 
real situation. The allocation subsystem must 
be able to react quickly and, even more 
important, must know when not to react at all. 
In addition, the jammer introduces a degree of 
uncertainty as to the available capacity left 
for the network, thus further complicating the 
allocation process.
Finally, with respect to the communications 
subsystem, the military SATCOM control system 
must provide a degree of antijam protection for 
the control link at least equivalent to that of 
the communications links that must be 
controlled. This will ensure a control 
capability at all times when the communications 
links are operable.
Strategies for Communicators and Jammers
The strategies for the communicator in a 
military satellite network center first about 
the alternatives available from which the 
network architecture can be selected and second 
about the various possible responses to the 
onset of jamming.
The prime consideration in selecting the 
network architecture is again the fundamental 
tradeoff of the availability of a particular 
link versus the potential capacity of the 
entire satellite network. It is apparent that 
there are two different operating modes for the 
military SATCOM network, a clear mode and an 
antijam mode. The clear mode of operations is 
characterized by the desire to maximize the
communications capacity of the network by 
reducing link margins to the greatest degree 
possible. This desire is predicated by the 
reality that most military satellite 
communication networks rarely if ever operate 
in an environment characterized by a determined 
jammer and therefore typically operate like 
nonmilitary networks. The antijam mode of 
operations on the other hand is characterized 
by an extremely significant reduction in the 
available capacity in order to assure a 
communications capability even in the face of 
the most determined jammer. This approach is 
justified since the scenarios that give rise to 
determined jammers are precisely those where 
link availability becomes most essential.
"The prime consideration in selecting the 
network architecture is the fundamental 
tradeoff of the availability of a link versus 
the potential capacity of the entire network. 11
There are some alternative network structures 
as shown in Figure 3 and therefore strategies 
to effectively provide both operating modes. 
One approach is to use the same modem equipment 
to provide both the clear and the AJ operating 
modes and adjust operating parameters of the 
equipment to transition between modes as a 
result of control system directives. This 
naturally is not as easy as it sounds, since it 
puts the full transition burden on the control 
system; but it does have the advantage, if the, 
transition can be done smoothly, of matching the 
right mode to the right scenario.
CONFIGURATION 1
DUAL MODE 
MODEM
4 —— > TRANSMIT/
RECEIVE
« ————— HC
CONFIGURATION 2
APPROACH A: SWITCH MODEM PARAMETERS BASED 
ON THE DETECTION OF JAMMING
APPROACH B: SWITCH MODEM PARAMETERS BASED ON 
THE POTENTIAL FOR NEAR TERM JAMMING
Figure 3. Alternate Architectures
An alternate approach that greatly reduces the 
burden on the control system is to transition 
the network between modes, not as a result of a 
reaction to jamming as determined by the 
network control system, but rather as a 
reaction to the potential for future jamming as 
determined by an assessment of the political 
and military situation. The penality paid here 
is the lost capacity either prior to the onset 
of jamming or if the jamming never occurs.
Still another approach is feasible if separate 
modem equipment is used to provide the clear
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and the A3 operating modes. This would allow 
simultaneous operation of both the A3 and the 
clear mode of operation. The approach would 
proceed with the few most critical channels 
assigned to the A3 mode of operation and all 
the other channels assigned to the clear mode 
of operation. The capacity of the network 
would only be slightly degraded due to 
self-interference between modes. The 
availability of the A3 links in the face of a 
jammer, while not as great as it would be if 
the bulk of the terminal EIRP was not allocated 
to the clear traffic, is still protected by the 
processing gain inherent in the A3 mode. The 
transition process in this architecture does 
not involve the establishment of new links or 
the reassignment of users from one mode to 
another but merely the switching of the 
terminal EIRP from the clear mode transmission 
to the antijam mode transmission.
"Three possible responses to jamming are to 
increase EIRP, reduce data rate and initiate an 
antijam operating mode."
Independent of the architecture there are some 
general responses that are available to the 
communicator once a jammer attacks the 
satellite. The possible responses include 
actions relative to the satellite as well as 
actions relative to the earth terminals. For 
the satellite, if there is antijam spatial 
processing on board, its use to reduce the 
jammer power incident on the transponder is one 
available response. A second response at the 
satellite would be an attempt by adjusting the 
gain control of the transponder to keep the 
transponder out of saturation independent of 
the jammer EIRP. This naturally depends on the 
particular transponder design as well as the 
jammer size.
At the earth terminals there are three 
responses that are apparent: an increase in 
EIRP, a reduction in data rate, or the 
initiation of the antijam operating mode. The 
appropriate response is naturally dependent on 
the specifics of the jamming attack.
From the jammer's viewpoint, there are 
alternative strategies available as well. In 
considering these strategies, the first point 
to realize is that the legitimate and realistic 
goal of the jammer is not to eliminate the 
ability to communicate but to reduce the 
ability to communicate. For both communicator 
and jammer, their abilities are not absolute 
but relative. The jammer must make the 
decision as to the strategy that minimizes the 
communicator's information transfer capability 
while requiring the commitment of a minimum 
amount of resources on his part. For example, 
all other things being equal, uplink jamming 
has the potential of taking down multiple links 
while downlink jamming takes down only one 
link. One approach that might be effective for 
a jammer, depending upon the design
architecture of the control process, would be 
to initiate an action that causes the 
communicator to transition his network. During 
the transition period it is likely that 
communications must be interrupted. Once the 
network transitions, the jammer can cease his 
action, thus "tempting" the communicator to 
reconfigure to the higher capacity network 
state that existed prior to his initial 
action. If the communicator does, there will 
be another interruption in traffic after which 
the jammer can repeat the process. This is an 
oversimplified example of a potentially 
rewarding strategy open to the jammer. How 
rewarding the strategy can be made to be is a 
function of the requirements placed on the 
control system with respect to maximizing 
system capacity and the reaction time of the 
entire network to control system directives.
"The realistic jammer objective is to reduce, 
not eliminate, the ability to communicate."
Other alternatives available to the jammer 
include his transmission bandwidth, whether he 
attacks the control link or the communications 
links and whether he attacks clear links only 
or he attacks A3 links as well. There are some 
general considerations with respect to each of 
these options.
The issue of the jammer bandwidth depends 
closely on whether antijam links, which 
nominally require the entire transponder 
bandwidth, or clear links are being attacked. 
In general there is no rationale for a jammer 
to spread his energy across an entire 
transponder since he will then be no more 
effective against a clear link as he would be 
against an antijam link.
With respect to attacking the control function 
rather than the communications links, this is a 
strategy that can potentially achieve a 
jammer's objective of minimizing communications 
via a minimum commitment of resources. 
Communications will eventually break down 
without an adequate control function and the 
control function might very well be susceptible 
to a low power downlink jammer at the control 
terminal.
The issue of attacking A3 links as well as 
clear links depends on the degree to which the 
jammer is committed to minimizing the 
communication capability and his ability to 
commit resources. It is apparent that the 
jammer has already achieved a degree of success 
by forcing the communicator Into an A3 
operating mode and it is also apparent that a 
greater degree of jamming resources is 
necessary to bring down the A3 links than was 
necessary to bring down the clear 1 inks.
Transltlonlng
The process of transltlonlng a satellite 
network in response to an ECH attack is
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naturally dependent on both the communications 
and control architectures of the individual 
network. Since it is extremely difficult to define a general approach to network 
transitioning, an example of a network 
transition process will be presented for a particular network with the following set of 
characteristics:
a. The clear (no ECM) operating mode has all 
users operating on nonprotected 
communication links.
b. The protected communication links operate in the clear without traffic at a minimum 
EIRP in order to minimize interference with 
the clear links but sufficient to maintain lock at each receiver.
c. In the clear the control link is a fully protected link operating both at a minimum data rate and minimum link margin between a 
single control terminal and each of the 
earth terminals that are included in the 
network.
d. All protected links include an automatic 
reacquisition capability whereby the links 
can reacquire after a loss of signal of duration denoted as the reacquisition 
window.
e. The monitoring capability of the control 
system is located at the control terminal 
and is capable of identifying and 
characterizing jammers.
The transition from a non-ECM to an ECM 
environment for a network with the above 
characteristics wduld proceed as follows:
Step 1: An uplink jammer begins transmission
Step 2: The clear links that are attacked lose 
the capability for information 
transfer and if the jammer is of 
sufficient magnitude the antijam links 
will lose lock also.
Step 3: The monitoring function of the control 
system identifies the presence of jamming and must determine the 
appropriate re-sponse depending on the 
assessment of the jammer magnitude.
Note: If the jammer was of sufficient 
magnitude to force the AJ links into 
reacquisition, it is likely that a reduction in bandwidth and/or an increase in EIRP for the failed clear links will be of little value. 
The step to be taken then is to reallocate EIRP from clear links to AJ links.
If the AJ links remain locked, the initial 
response would appear to be a reduction in data 
rate and/or an increase in EIRP for the clear links.
For the remaining steps assume that the jammer 
was sufficient to knock the AJ links into 
reacquisition.
Step 4: The controller increases the EIRP for 
the protected control link to a level 
sufficient for all network 
participants to reacqu' e the control link.
Step 5: The controller now directs network 
participants to abandon the clear 
operating mode for the AJ operating 
mode, thus allocating terminal EIRP to 
the AJ links.
Step 6: The AJ communications links between 
network participants automatically 
reacquire (as long as the above steps 
are accomplished within the 
reacquisition window).
Step 7: The controller directs minimum
operating data rates on all AJ links initially along with peak terminal 
EIRP's if the jammer has already 
driven the satellite into saturation.
Step 8: Based upon close coordination with the 
satellite controller and based also on 
the output from the monitoring 
process, the network controller can 
attempt data rate increases on the AJ links.
Conclusions
In summary, this paper has pointed out the importance of network control for all satellite 
communications systems. In the case of a 
military satellite communications system, the importance is compounded by the threat of an 
ECM attack and the preventive measures 
typically taken by the MILSATCOM system. The 
control system complexity for the military 
SATCOM system depends principally on the degree 
to which link margins are attempted to be 
reduced (network capacity increased). In one 
extreme where a system is designed solely with 
regard to link availability and thus with no 
emphasis on system capacity, the control system has little or no complexity. On the other hand, when a system is designed to adapt 
capacity depending on the current scenario, the 
network control system and particularly the 
monitoring portion of it can become extremely 
complex.
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